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ENTRAL TO LUCK EGALITARIANISM is the idea that people 
should not fare differently from one another based solely on differ-
ences in luck. To demonstrate the intuitive appeal of this idea, luck 
egalitarians point to examples of luck-based inequalities that are widely re-
garded as unjust – for instance, disparities in individuals’ opportunities for 
economic advancement based on contingent factors such as skin color or 
gender. Yet, upon reflection, the intuitive appeal of the idea that inequalities 
due to differences in luck are for that reason unjust appears questionable. To 
illustrate, it does not seem an injustice that beautiful people are asked out on 
more dates than the homely, nor that clumsier individuals might be indefi-
nitely relegated to the bench while those with innate athletic prowess shine 
on the football field.   
How can it be that (1) the unjust nature of certain inequalities seems to 
be explained by their source in luck, while (2) not all inequalities that stem 
from luck seem unjust? Kok-Chor Tan (2008; 2011; 2012) advances a theory 
of egalitarian justice that answers that question. His theory has two central 
commitments: it has an institutional focus and it is luck egalitarian. Tan calls his 
theory institutional luck egalitarianism (ILE). Based on its institutional focus, 
ILE implies that luck-based inequalities are unjust if and only if they are pro-
duced by institutions. Due to its luck egalitarian character, ILE implies that 
institutional arrangements that impact individuals’ lives violate the demands 
of distributive justice if and only if they favor some over others based on 
luck.  
Tan thinks ILE can explain the unjust nature of those luck-based ine-
qualities that seem intuitively troubling, thereby accommodating (1). The ex-
planation is that the luck-based inequalities that seem intuitively unjust turn 
out to have an institutional cause. He also thinks ILE can accommodate (2), 
the intuition that not all luck-based inequalities are unjust. The explanation is 
that the luck-based inequalities that do not seem intuitively unjust turn out 
not to have an institutional cause.  
In accounting for both (1) and (2), Tan (2008: 667-68; 2012: 90, 97-99, 
126-29 and 142-44) takes his theory to compare favorably to two rival theo-
ries of egalitarian justice – democratic equality and trans-institutional versions 
of luck egalitarianism (TILE).1 Each of these other theories, he argues, ac-
counts for either (1) or (2) but does so at the cost of sacrificing the other. 
Democratic equality fails to account for (1) because it implies that the de-
mands of egalitarian justice are not foundationally concerned with counter-
acting luck-based inequalities. And TILE fails to accommodate (2) because it 
                                                
1 Tan (2012: 97 and 128) regards Anderson (1999), Freeman (2007) and Rawls (2001) as pro-
ponents of democratic equality, and Arneson (2000) as a proponent of TILE. 
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implies that all luck-based inequalities that can be addressed, even those that 
are not produced by institutions, are unjust. 
I will argue that ILE does not account for both (1) and (2).2 That ILE 
gives the impression of doing so derives from an ambiguity concerning what 
it means for an inequality to qualify as institutionally influenced. On some 
conceptions of institutional influence, ILE accounts for (1) but not (2). On 
other conceptions, ILE accounts for (2) but not (1). It is doubtful that there 
is any tenable conception that enables ILE to avoid this dilemma. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 1, I explain how, according to 
Tan, ILE’s luck-egalitarian character and institutional focus enable the theory 
to account for both (1) and (2). In section 2, I set out the details of the di-
lemma that ILE faces. In section 3, I develop and reject a response suggested 
by some of Tan’s remarks. In section 4, I conclude by explaining why the 
dilemma exposes serious shortcomings of ILE and what this implies for the 
prospects of ILE in relation to competing theories. 
 
1. The Range on ILE 
 
Take the range specified by a theory of egalitarian justice to include those, and 
only those, inequalities that count as unjust on that theory.3 Accounting for 
(1) and (2) is a matter of which inequalities are in the range on ILE and why. 
So, let us turn to Tan’s explanation of why particular inequalities are in the 
range on ILE. 
According to Tan, what individuals owe to one another as a matter of 
distributive justice is informed by the relationships in which they stand. He 
takes relations of impact, in which individuals affect one another through 
institutional arrangements that regulate their interaction, to give rise to de-
mands of distributive justice. Those who are affected by an institution are 
owed justification for the character of its impact (2012: 158-59).  
In Tan’s view, that justification should be luck egalitarian. Luck egalitari-
ans, as Tan characterizes the position, endorse the luck/choice principle, on 
which the relative distributive shares individuals are accorded ought to be 
“fundamentally choice-sensitive but luck-insensitive” (2008: 666; see also 
2012: 88-91 and 108). This means, on the one hand, that individuals should 
not fare differently from one another simply due to differences in luck – that 
                                                
2 I do not take a stance in this paper on whether a plausible theory of egalitarian justice 
ought to account for both (1) and (2).  
3 The range encompasses two other dimensions of a theory of egalitarian justice: (1) its scope 
– between whom demands of egalitarian justice arise, and (2) its currency – what should be 
equalized, for instance, resources, welfare or something else. I follow Tan (2012: 15-16 and 
105-6) in discussing ILE in a general form that does not presume a commitment to any par-
ticular currency. 
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 8, NO. 1 
AGAINST INSTITUTIONAL LUCK EGALITARIANISM 
Rekha Nath 
 3 
is, contingent factors over which they have no control. On the other hand, 
inequalities that can be traced to choice rather than to luck are acceptable.4  
So, in institutional contexts, in which demands of distributive justice 
arise, what individuals are owed is determined by the luck/choice principle 
on ILE. This principle implies that it is unjust for an institutional arrange-
ment to favor some of the individuals whose lives it impacts over others 
based on matters of luck. This explanation of how institutions activate luck-
egalitarian demands specifies what is in the range on ILE: if an inequality is 
luck-based and produced by an institution, then it is in the range on this the-
ory. 
Moreover, on ILE, only inequalities that are luck-based and have an insti-
tutional input qualify as unjust and thus fall in the range. That is, on Tan’s 
view, considerations of justice only arise in the presence of institutions that 
affect people’s lives, while “natural facts … are neither just nor unjust in 
themselves” (2012: 153-54). What accounts for the injustice of particular 
morally arbitrary inequalities, for Tan, is “the fact that existing social and po-
litical institutions and practices have converted … natural and contingent 
facts into social advantages and disadvantages for people” (2012: 153). So, on 
this theory, all that individuals are owed as a matter of distributive justice is 
that institutions do not discriminate based on luck in determining their rela-
tive shares. 
Why does Tan take the luck/choice principle to exclusively concern how 
individuals are affected by institutional arrangements?5 An alternative is that 
other instances of impact – such as when individuals affect one another in-
dependently of institutional arrangements – would also activate the 
luck/choice principle. Consider an example to see what this alternative would 
entail. Suppose a parent spends hours each evening helping his daughter fine-
tune her tennis strokes. Due to all this help, his child outshines her school 
teammates on the court. Her advantage over the others is due to luck: the 
other kids are not so fortunate to have parents with the time or the skills to 
provide such extra coaching. If the luck/choice principle were to apply to an 
individual’s every action that affects others, then the morally arbitrary ine-
quality that the father produces in this case would be unjust. To remedy this 
injustice, he might extend an invitation to all interested kids who wish to join 
                                                
4 On luck egalitarianism, satisfaction of luck-insensitivity in individuals’ relative shares entails 
satisfaction of choice-sensitivity (and vice versa). Whether there is a plausible means by which to 
determine the source of an inequality, in luck or in choice, has been subject to considerable 
debate. For the sake of argument, I assume in what follows that there is indeed such a means 
of doing so. In any case, this is not an issue that uniquely confronts Tan but one that faces 
all luck egalitarians. See Tan (2008: 668-69; 2012: 91-97) on the luck/choice distinction. 
5 Although, on ILE, the luck/choice principle only directly concerns the design of institu-
tions, the theory also implies that individuals have obligations to one another: those who 
partake in an institutional arrangement have mutual, institutionally mediated obligations to 
ensure that the rules of that arrangement do not discriminate based on luck (2012: 19-21).  
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these coaching sessions instead of devoting disproportionate attention to his 
own daughter. 
In Tan’s view, inequalities of the sort produced by the father’s exclusive 
coaching of his daughter do not qualify as unjust. And he rejects the alterna-
tive that implies otherwise. He explains that if the luck/choice principle were 
to regulate individuals’ actions, then their abilities to engage in valuable per-
sonal pursuits stand to be significantly constrained (2012: 19-34 and 192-93). 
This would be problematic since some personal endeavors, such as a parent’s 
focus on improving only his daughter’s tennis skills, seem legitimate in spite 
of generating morally arbitrary inequalities. ILE accommodates this intuition. 
As Tan emphasizes, on the basis of its exclusive focus on institutions, his 
theory “allows for a way of reconciling the impersonal demands of egalitarian 
justice and the pursuits of personal ends and commitments” (2012: 50). ILE 
does this because it mandates that, on the one hand, the institutional ar-
rangements that fundamentally shape individuals’ lives must refrain from dis-
criminating based on luck and, on the other hand, space be preserved for in-
dividuals to engage in valuable personal endeavors within the institutional 
parameters that are set.6 
Furthermore, Tan takes distributive justice to concern only “how per-
sons fare in relation to each other above a threshold of sufficiency” (2012: 
100). So, below this threshold, considerations of distributive justice do not 
arise in his view.7 Above this threshold, he takes the luck/choice principle to 
have primacy in determining what individuals are owed as a matter of distribu-
tive justice. What that means is that the luck/choice principle alone provides 
a foundational basis for determining individuals’ distributive entitlements on 
ILE (2008: 667, 679 and 688-89; 2012: 125-26 and 141). Other normative 
considerations do not play a role in determining what counts as a just share. 
So, on ILE, for an inequality to be in the range, it is necessary and suffi-
cient that it be luck-based and institutionally influenced. Tan takes the range 
on his theory to be neither implausibly narrow nor implausibly broad: that is, 
it includes intuitively troubling inequalities and excludes inequalities that do 
not intuitively seem to be a matter of justice. 
To see why Tan thinks the range on ILE is not implausibly narrow, con-
sider a case he discusses (2012: 162-63). Two communities live along differ-
ent parts of a river in relative isolation from one another. Both depend on 
                                                
6 For a morally arbitrary inequality to be in the range on Tan’s theory it must have an institu-
tional input. However, his argument for an exclusive focus on institutions (which I have just 
summarized) does not address the issue of range. Instead, it addresses the issue of the site of 
justice, in particular, whether principles of justice directly apply only to institutions, as Tan 
argues, or also to individuals. These two issues, site and range, are independent: an institu-
tional site does not imply an institutional range, and an institutional range does not imply an 
institutional site. I will address the plausibility of restricting the range to inequalities with an 
institutional input in the following section. 
7 However, in such cases, Tan (2012: 100-102) thinks that moral considerations distinct from 
distributive justice may come into play. In this way, ILE is compatible with a humanitarian 
principle mandating assistance for individuals suffering basic-needs deprivations.  
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 8, NO. 1 
AGAINST INSTITUTIONAL LUCK EGALITARIANISM 
Rekha Nath 
 5 
the river for fish. One day, the community that is settled upstream in relation 
to the other places a net across the river. Doing so enables members of the 
upstream community to catch more fish than they could before, while it 
worsens members of the downstream community’s access to the same (alt-
hough their ability to meet their basic needs is not compromised). 
This might seem to be a case in which there are no institutional connec-
tions between the two societies yet in which the morally arbitrary inequality 
between them is troubling. However, Tan explains, he understands “institu-
tions” broadly, taking this term to encompass legally regulated, political and 
economic institutional arrangements as well as social practices, norms and 
expectations that publicly regulate the basis upon which individuals interact 
and affect each other’s lives (2011: 411; 2012: 35-38 and 157-58).8 Conse-
quently, because the upstream community puts into place an arrangement 
that affects those in the downstream community, ILE implies that the latter 
are owed a justification for how they are affected by it (2012: 162-63). The 
upstream community’s decision to place the net across the river is unjust in-
sofar as it privileges some individuals over others based on the contingent 
matter of where along the river they happen to live. 
Still, it might seem that some inequalities due solely to natural misfor-
tune are unjust but, implausibly, would be excluded from the range on ILE. 
Take the case of a society that lacks a public education system in which the 
life prospects of a child who happens to be born to impoverished, deadbeat 
parents who do not invest in her education will be bleak compared to a child 
who has wealthy, conscientious parents. It might appear that ILE cannot ac-
count for the unjust nature of this inequality since a society does not control 
what sort of parents one happens to have. However, Tan (2008: 672-73) 
thinks that an institutional explanation for this disadvantage can be found. 
Usually, he notes, a child’s chances of economic success are not merely a 
function of unluckily having poor parents, but rather are significantly influ-
enced by her society’s institutions. 
Analogously, it may initially seem that ILE would not count as unjust 
the disadvantaged position of those who have suffered great losses caused by 
a hurricane or the relative hardships faced by individuals born with physical 
disabilities. Again, Tan (2008: 681) points out how the particular design of a 
society’s institutions can significantly affect the extent to which natural disas-
                                                
8 Given this broad construal of institutions as well as the existence of numerous norms regu-
lating interaction across state borders, Tan (2012: 153-59 and 170-71) thinks that ILE can 
account for the intuitively unjust nature of many global inequalities. Moreover, he takes ILE 
to support a more plausible moral assessment of global inequality than democratic equality 
does. On democratic equality, as Tan characterizes the position, there must be a commit-
ment to democratic reciprocity on a global level for cross-border egalitarian demands to be 
activated. Consequently, he takes democratic equality to either imply that global inequalities 
are not unjust or give a less plausible explanation than ILE does of why they are unjust 
(2008: 687-90; 2011: 398 and 412; 2012: 135-36, 144-45, 157-58, 163-65 and 187). In the 
latter case, he suggests that democratic equality would fail to capture why certain global ine-
qualities seem intuitively troubling: namely, that they result from luck-based discrimination. 
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ter victims are disadvantaged. And insofar as the design of a society’s public 
spaces is primarily geared toward accommodating the able bodied, with stairs 
and high curbs that are incompatible with the mobility needs of individuals in 
wheelchairs, institutions can be shown to play a role in turning a natural con-
tingency into a disadvantage (2008: 673, n. 16). Based on such observations, 
Tan suggests that “given the wide and interconnecting reach of social institu-
tions, many of the typical cases of social and economic inequalities that exer-
cise egalitarians can be revealed to have an underlying institutional explana-
tion” (2008: 673). So, that is why he thinks the range on ILE is not implausi-
bly narrow. 
Tan also maintains that the range on ILE is not implausibly broad. Re-
call the case of homely individuals who get asked out on dates by desirable 
suitors less frequently than their better-looking peers. Suppose that the beau-
tiful are lavished with gifts, taken to fine restaurants and the opera, and 
whisked away by their suitors on holidays to exotic places like Tahiti, while 
the ugly miss out on these things.9 On TILE, this inequality is unjust and 
should be remedied by such measures as publicly subsidized cosmetic surgery 
or monetary compensation for the ugly. However, to the extent that such 
inequalities do not result from a discriminatory institutional arrangement, 
Tan (2008: 126-29) emphasizes that ILE avoids this absurd implication. 
He describes other examples of inequalities that would be excluded from 
the range on his theory (2012: 142-43). Individuals who happen to be slightly 
shortsighted or flat-footed, but whose inflictions are not so bad as to raise 
humanitarian concerns, would not be owed social compensation for small 
burdens associated with their conditions. Again, such parties do not have a 
claim on society to the extent that their afflictions are not brought about by 
institutions. Tan finds this result plausible, noting that it does not seem un-
reasonable that individuals be expected to personally bear minor costs asso-
ciated with these conditions, for instance, by paying for eyeglasses or arch 
supports. In this way, he takes ILE to accommodate the intuition that not all 
inequalities that stem from luck seem unjust.  
 
2. A Dilemma for ILE 
 
That ILE has a plausible range is for Tan a principal virtue of his theory. But 
is he correct that its range is plausible? That is, does the range on ILE in fact 
accommodate our intuitions about which inequalities are unjust? The answer 
depends on whether ILE actually upholds Tan’s verdicts on the sorts of cas-
es he discusses – the river, education, hurricane and disability cases, on the 
one hand, and the ugliness, shortsightedness and flat-footedness cases, on 
                                                
9 Tan does not specify which relative disadvantages endured by the ugly would be excluded 
from the range on ILE. However, this illustration seems to capture the sorts of inequalities 
he has in mind based on remarks he makes (2008: 671-72 and 680-83; 2011: 403; 2012: 76-79 
and 126-27). 
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the other. The capacity of the theory to support these and relevantly similar 
verdicts may be seen as a litmus test for assessing Tan’s claim that ILE im-
plies a range that is neither implausibly narrow nor broad. To imply a plausi-
ble range, ILE need not yield the desired verdicts in every conceivable case. 
But its verdicts must generally cohere with the relevant intuitions, or Tan’s 
defense of the theory on this count is undermined.10 
To determine whether ILE does actually support the desired verdicts, 
we need to be able to tell which morally arbitrary inequalities are brought 
about by institutions. That is, we need to know when it is the case that insti-
tutions turn natural contingencies into social (dis)advantages for some indi-
viduals such that the ensuing luck-based inequalities qualify as institutionally 
influenced.11 Despite the centrality of the concept of institutional influence to 
his theory, Tan never spells out precisely what it means for an institution to 
produce an inequality. This is a serious omission. 
I will address this omission by considering different conceptions of insti-
tutional influence that ILE might employ. I will argue, however, than none 
suffices for his purposes. There appears to be no conception of institutional 
influence on which the range on ILE avoids being implausibly narrow or im-
plausibly broad by Tan’s own lights of what counts as plausible. My argu-
ment takes the form of a dilemma and can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. If, on a certain conception, C, of institutional influence, ILE excludes from the 
range the sorts of inequalities that Tan thinks it should exclude, then the range will 
be implausibly narrow: for the range will also exclude inequalities that Tan thinks it 
should include. 
 
2. If, on a certain conception, C, of institutional influence, ILE includes in the 
range the sorts of inequalities that Tan thinks it should include, then the range will 
be implausibly broad: for the range will also include inequalities that Tan thinks it 
should exclude. 
 
3. Therefore, on any conception of institutional influence, the range on ILE will be 
(by Tan’s own lights of what counts as plausible) either implausibly narrow or im-
plausibly broad. 
 
Of course, I cannot consider all possible conceptions of institutional in-
fluence that ILE might employ. But I will consider what seem to be the most 
likely candidates, each of which is suggested by some of Tan’s comments on 
the matter. Each implies that the range on ILE is implausible (again, by Tan’s 
own lights). If there is a different conception that would enable the theory to 
avoid that problematic implication, it is far from clear what that would be. 
In the river case discussed above, Tan emphasizes that the upstream 
community’s intervention creates an unjust inequality: the intervention causes 
                                                
10 Tan (2012: 142-44) appears to hold his theory to this standard. 
11 Tan (2008: 671-75, 680-81 and 689) variously refers to (dis)advantages with an “institu-
tional input,” instances in which institutions “convert” or “turn” matters of luck into social 
(dis)advantages and in which they “generate” or “confer” (dis)advantage.  
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members of the downstream community to become worse off (relative to 
members of the upstream community) than they were before. This suggests 
that the notion of institutional influence ILE relies upon may be understood 
as follows. An institutional arrangement produces an inequality if and only if 
it causes some individuals to become worse off (relative to others) than they 
were prior to being impacted by that institutional arrangement (relative to 
those others). Call this conception of institutional influence C1, and call ILE 
on C1 ILE-C1.12 
On reflection, however, the range on ILE-C1 turns out to be implausi-
bly narrow. This is because on ILE-C1 an institutional arrangement may jus-
tifiably treat parties differently based on luck if those who are accorded a 
lesser share than others have happened to fare worse than the relevant others 
all along. Recall Tan’s verdict that a society treats disabled citizens unjustly in 
failing to accommodate them adequately in public spaces. Now consider two 
variants of this case. In Variant One, a state-funded renovation project de-
molishes handicapped-accessible public spaces and replaces them with areas 
that do not accommodate wheelchairs. Due to this renovation, there is now a 
significant discrepancy in access to public spaces between the disabled and 
the able bodied as compared to before. In Variant Two, take a society that 
has never adopted measures to accommodate the disabled in public spaces. 
Again, the society renovates its public spaces, and this renovation leaves un-
changed the handicapped-inaccessible status of those spaces. So, unlike in 
Variant One, the disabled fare no worse relative to able-bodied citizens than 
they did before the renovations.13 
ILE-C1 implies that in Variant One, but not in Variant Two, the relative 
disadvantage of the disabled citizens is institutionally influenced and thus un-
just. In Variant One, the institutional intervention results in increasing the 
morally arbitrary disparity in access to public spaces between disabled and 
able-bodied citizens. In Variant Two, however, the institutional intervention 
does not increase the disparity that was already in place. So, in Variant Two, 
the inequality does not qualify as unjust on C1. Tan would not accept that 
result. The difference between Variant One and Variant Two does not seem 
relevant to determining the demands of justice. In both cases, he would 
maintain that the disabled are treated unjustly. So, C1 does not seem to be 
the conception of institutional influence that he has in mind. 
                                                
12 Besides cases in which institutional arrangements worsen a person’s relative position com-
pared to how she fared before the imposition of those arrangements, this conception can be 
broadened to include cases in which institutional arrangements worsen a person’s relative 
position compared to how she would have fared in the absence of those arrangements. With 
this addition, ILE-C1 can account for the injustice of inequalities in cases of longstanding, 
discriminatory institutional arrangements in which a historical benchmark of how parties 
fared before their subjection to those arrangements would have no referent.  
13 We might plausibly assume that individuals who happen to be disabled would tend to face 
greater hardships than able-bodied persons in the absence of any social institutions at all. 
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Consider why the judgment yielded by ILE-CI in Variant Two seems 
misguided. In this case, society regulates the design of public spaces, and it 
thereby determines how its members will be able to make use of those areas. 
Because society plays this role of determining the character of public spaces, 
it seems that individuals are owed a justification for how they will be affected 
by its policies on this issue. From a luck-egalitarian standpoint, it seems that 
society should not discriminate based on morally arbitrary factors in deter-
mining how much citizens stand to benefit from its policies relative to one 
another, even if similar luck-based inequalities would obtain between the rel-
evant individuals in the absence of the imposition of those policies. So, the 
fact that there were morally arbitrary inequalities prior to an institutional in-
tervention does not seem to give a society license to preserve those pre-
institutional inequalities through the policies that it adopts.  
One might infer from this reasoning that whether an institutional ar-
rangement is unjust turns on whether it treats some individuals more favora-
bly than others based on contingent factors, regardless of how those individ-
uals fared relative to one another in the past. In both variants of the case at 
hand, this implies that, given society’s role in determining the design of pub-
lic spaces, it owes to all citizens the enjoyment of luck-insensitive relative ac-
cess to those spaces. These reflections suggest a conception of institutional 
influence that differs from C1: An institutional arrangement produces an in-
equality if and only if it regulates the distribution of some good, and it grants 
some individuals a lesser share than others of the given good. Call this con-
ception C2.  
However, ILE-C2 appears to imply an implausibly narrow range, just as 
ILE-C1 does. Recall the case of a society with no public education system in 
which individuals born into poverty generally are not as well positioned as 
others to obtain desirable economic positions. Let us consider whether ILE-
C2 supports Tan’s verdict that this inequality is unjust. On ILE-C2, for an 
inequality to be unjust it must result from an institutional arrangement that 
arbitrarily grants a greater distributive share to some individuals over others. 
But, in this case, it is not clear which aspect of the society’s institutional ar-
rangement can be criticized. The fact that some individuals have inferior op-
portunities for attaining an education does not seem traceable to any discrim-
inatory institutional practice: there is no public system of education under 
which opportunities are unequal. It is the very absence of the social regula-
tion of education that seems problematic. Yet if we cannot point to any way 
in which particular institutional policies arbitrarily favor some over others, 
then it looks as though this inequality fails to qualify as unjust on ILE-C2. 
This result suggests that Tan would reject C2. 
In response, Tan might argue that owing to its failure to establish a sys-
tem of universal education this society can be regarded as producing the dis-
advantages endured by those citizens who are deprived of a decent education. 
After all, that failure reflects an institutional decision made by society con-
cerning which public goods it will and will not provide. This reasoning lends 
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support to Tan’s desired verdict. However, the reasoning makes appeal to a 
conception of institutional influence that is distinct from C2. The reasoning 
implies that an institution’s imposition of policies regulating people’s relative 
enjoyment of some good is equivalent to an institution’s failure to adopt pol-
icies that would do the same. That is, both what an institution does and that 
which it refrains from doing qualify as ways in which it exerts impact over a 
distribution of goods. In this respect, this conception of institutional influ-
ence is broader than C2. On C2, only those distributive shares that an institu-
tion’s rules actually do regulate qualify as institutionally influenced. On this 
more expansive conception, however, an institutional arrangement produces 
an inequality if and only if its regulation of, or its failure to regulate, the distribu-
tion of some good results in some individuals having a lesser share than oth-
ers of the given good. Call the latter conception C3.14 
But ILE-C3 will not do either, as it implies an implausibly broad range. 
As noted above, Tan is at pains to emphasize that there is a morally relevant 
difference between social disadvantages, which have an institutional input, 
and those disadvantages that are merely due to natural misfortune. He is clear 
that his theory allows for cases of natural misfortunes that society could ad-
dress but need not as a matter of justice (2012: 127 and 142-44). For instance, 
he maintains that society need not provide corrective eyewear for the slightly 
shortsighted nor must it address all inequalities between the beautiful and 
ugly that are associated with their personal relationships. However, ILE-C3 
implies otherwise. In the latter case, if a society could mitigate the disad-
vantages borne by the ugly by offering them publicly subsidized cosmetic 
surgery, then on ILE-C3 it must do so. This is because, on this conception, 
institutions must combat any morally arbitrary disadvantages that they are 
able to address. Within an institutional context, ILE-C3 appears to leave no 
room for the distinction Tan wishes to maintain between social disad-
vantages and merely natures ones: any natural contingency that an institution 
can address turns out to be social. So, ILE-C3 gives rise to implications that 
Tan rejects.  
Setting aside C3, let us consider a different response to the charge that 
the range on ILE-C2 is implausibly narrow. To recall, the problematic verdict 
ILE-C2 appears to support, that unequal access to education is not unjust, 
was grounded in the observation that the society in question fails to regulate 
the provision of education. But, it might be pointed out, that assessment fails 
to take into account the fact that, by upholding the institutional apparatus 
needed to sustain a functioning market economy, this society regulates the 
distribution of economic opportunities between its members. And because 
society regulates this distribution, ILE-C2 implies that it would be unjust for 
some persons to enjoy superior economic opportunities to others based on 
contingent factors. Suppose that society’s adoption of a system of universal 
                                                
14 Tan’s (2012: 35-38) discussion indicates support in some places for a conception like C2 
and in others for a conception like C3. 
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education would play a crucial role in reducing morally arbitrary inequalities 
in economic opportunities. In that case, then, ILE-C2 supports the verdict 
that this society ought to ensure that all citizens have access to a decent edu-
cation, since doing so would be instrumental to reducing inequalities in eco-
nomic opportunities.  
This same reasoning seems to support Tan’s verdicts in other cases. Ar-
guably, social measures to ensure handicapped-accessible public spaces and 
to provide natural disaster relief are also instrumental to combating the 
emergence of luck-based inequalities in economic opportunities. In this way, 
one could argue that, on reflection, ILE-C2 avoids implying an implausibly 
narrow range.15 
However, now ILE-C2 confronts the opposite problem of implying an 
implausibly broad range. To see this, consider a variant of the river case dis-
cussed above. As before, suppose that two societies are settled along differ-
ent parts of a river. Call them Upstream and Downstream. For many years, they 
live in complete isolation from one another. One day their paths cross, and 
they decide to establish a cross-society postal system to facilitate written 
communication between them. Let us suppose that the institution of the 
cross-society postal system gives rise to a benefit of which many citizens of 
the two societies avail themselves: having pen-pal relationships with foreign-
ers. The pen-pal exchange turns out to be fulfilling for its participants. Mean-
ingful friendships are forged, and participants benefit from this unique op-
portunity to learn about a different culture. Postal correspondence, however, 
is the extent of cross-society interaction, and otherwise the Upstreamers and 
Downstreamers continue to remain isolated. 
It becomes apparent over time that some parties benefit more than oth-
ers do from the postal system. Suppose that all Downstreamers have pen-
pals, but only some Upstreamers do. The uneven participation of Upstream-
ers in the pen-pal exchange is due to a confidence gap within the Upstream 
society based on physical appearance. For years, before the two societies 
came into contact, those Upstreamers who happen to be blessed with good 
looks have been showered with praise by those around them, and conse-
quently they are more confident than those Upstreamers who are homely. 
Based on this difference in confidence levels, the good-looking Upstreamers 
are more likely than their plainer-looking fellow citizens to sustain fulfilling 
pen-pal relationships with Downstreamers. Sadly, many homely Upstreamers 
receive no mail from Downstreamers, though they wish that they did. So, 
while those Upstreamers who are good-looking and all of the Downstream-
ers benefit from this cross-society institution, the ugly Upstreamers do not 
benefit from it at all. 
ILE-C2 implies that this inequality is unjust. It does so based on the fol-
lowing line of reasoning. By establishing the postal system, the two societies 
have put into place an institutional arrangement that gives rise to a benefit 
                                                
15 Some of Tan’s remarks (2012: 44-47 and 104-5) suggest this reasoning. 
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for their members – partaking in the pen-pal exchange – that did not exist 
before. Because the design of this institutional arrangement determines the 
extent to which different individuals who are subject to it will enjoy that ben-
efit, on ILE-C2 it follows that the Upstreamers and Downstreamers must 
ensure that some of them do not enjoy a greater share of the benefit than 
others based on contingent factors. Consequently, it is unjust that the less 
good-looking Upstreamers do not benefit from this arrangement on a par 
with the others. 
Consider the sorts of measures that may be called for to address this in-
justice. The Upstreamers and Downstreamers may be required to institute a 
cross-society redistributive scheme – perhaps by taxing postal supplies – and 
offer subsidized opportunities for cosmetic surgery or compensation to ugly 
Upstreamers. Alternatively, they might embark upon a cross-society cam-
paign to challenge the prevailing norms of beauty in Upstream by, say, glori-
fying the likes of Shrek on stamps. Analogous cross-society demands of jus-
tice would arise to address any other contingencies that translate into lesser 
benefit from the postal system for some individuals. So, for instance, it 
would be unjust for some to receive less mail than others due to the misfor-
tune of having bad penmanship or a poor memory for recalling zip codes.  
Given the striking asymmetry between, on the one hand, the relatively 
minimal impact the postal system has on people’s lives, and, on the other 
hand, the extensive demands of egalitarian justice posited, this seems to be 
the sort of verdict that Tan takes to be associated with an implausibly broad 
range. The postal system does nothing more than enable written communica-
tion between foreigners. Yet, on ILE-C2, Downstreamers (in addition to 
beautiful Upstreamers) could be required to make significant contributions to 
a redistributive scheme benefiting ugly Upstreamers simply because they be-
long to this common institution that facilitates the exchange of mail.  
In response, Tan might deny that such cross-society demands of justice 
arise on ILE-C2 on the grounds that Downstreamers play no role in generat-
ing the ugly Upstreamers’ disadvantage. Here he might point out that it is 
only members of Upstream, and not of Downstream, who are responsible 
for perpetuating the standards of beauty and associated social norms that re-
sult in the lower self-esteem of ugly Upstreamers. Because these problematic 
standards and norms that result in unequal benefit from the postal system are 
upheld within the confines of the Upstream society, Tan might argue that the 
demand to address this inequality, if it is an injustice at all, should be borne 
by Upstreamers alone rather than being a shared obligation of members of 
both societies. 
But that response appeals to a factor that is irrelevant on ILE-C2. It is 
true that Downstreamers play no role in bringing about the diminished con-
fidence of the ugly Upstreamers, which is a factor that crucially accounts for 
the morally arbitrary inequality in benefit from the postal system. Yet, in the 
cases discussed above of inequalities that are plausibly included in the range 
on ILE-C2, the ultimate source of an inequality is irrelevant. All that is rele-
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vant to establishing that an inequality is institutionally influenced is that an 
institution regulates the distribution of some good that is unevenly distribut-
ed. And if an institution plays this role, then it is unjust for some to enjoy 
greater distributive shares than others of the given good based on luck. So, 
for the sake of consistency, it appears that Tan is committed to the verdict 
that the imperative to remedy such inequalities is borne by both Upstreamers 
and Downstreamers. 
Tan might claim that my argument concerning this case ignores a rele-
vant factor. He might say that on ILE not just any institutional arrangement 
at all that regulates the distribution of goods gives rise to demands of egali-
tarian justice. Instead, he might take those demands to be activated only by 
institutions that fundamentally influence individuals’ life prospects by defin-
ing and protecting their basic distributive entitlements. On this line, consid-
erations of egalitarian justice arise in and only in the context of background 
rules and norms that determine people’s basic distributive shares. This sug-
gests a different conception of institutional influence, which we can call C4. 
On C4, an institutional arrangement produces an inequality if and only if it 
regulates basic distributive entitlements, and with respect to those entitle-
ments it grants some individuals a lesser share than others.16 
It seems that on ILE-C4 the postal system would not suffice to activate 
demands of egalitarian justice since this institution merely facilitates the cir-
culation of mail between Upstreamers and Downstreamers against a back-
drop of preexisting distributive entitlements (as determined by the property-
rights schemes respectively imposed within the Upstream and Downstream 
societies). Thus, it appears that ILE-C4 might avoid the sort of implausible 
verdict generated on ILE-C2 – that extensive demands of justice arise in the 
face of institutions that seem to have very little impact on people’s lives. 
Since defining and enforcing property rights is a key way in which insti-
tutions can determine people’s basic distributive shares, only inequalities in 
distributive holdings that are not subject to property rights protection be-
tween unequally situated parties will be excluded from the range on ILE-C4. 
However, the inequalities that Tan regards as plausibly falling outside of the 
range on ILE do not fall outside of the reach of such property rights protec-
tion. And so the inequalities he thinks should be excluded from the range for 
his theory to avoid an implausibly broad range are not excluded on ILE-C4.  
To see this, consider the following case. Adele, who is beautiful, receives 
a diamond bracelet from one of her many admirers. Her fellow citizen, Be-
atrice, is not so lucky in the looks department. She has no admirers and never 
receives such extravagant gifts. Beatrice becomes envious of Adele – so en-
vious that she steals the bracelet. The police find the bracelet in Beatrice’s 
possession and return it to Adele, whom society recognizes as its rightful 
owner. In this case, society upholds Adele’s property right to the greater 
                                                
16 Tan’s (2008: 684-87; 2012: 127 and 129-33) remarks seem to reflect support for a concep-
tion like C4. 
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share of resources that she has, in part due to her beauty, and this right is 
enforced against others, such as Beatrice, who have less because they happen 
not to be as beautiful. Since this inequality in their distributive holdings is 
afforded institutional protection by their society’s property rights scheme, it 
qualifies as institutionally influenced on C4. So, on ILE-C4, it is in the range. 
Yet the unequal distribution of jewelry between Adele and Beatrice seems to 
be precisely the sort of inequality that Tan thinks should be excluded from 
the range. 
For the inequality between Adele and Beatrice to qualify as unjust on 
ILE-C4, they need not even belong to the same society. Suppose that Adele 
and Beatrice are citizens of different societies. Beatrice immigrates to Adele’s 
society, and as before she is filled with envy and steals Adele’s bracelet. As-
suming that this society’s property rights rules apply to immigrants within its 
borders, Beatrice would be liable to criminal charges for her theft of Adele’s 
property, just as before. Alternatively, suppose that Beatrice is prevented 
from entering Adele’s society based on its restrictive immigration policies. In 
this instance too, Adele’s property right to the bracelet would be enforced 
against Beatrice, albeit indirectly: those who are barred from entering a socie-
ty are thereby prevented from gaining access to the goods recognized as the 
property of those within that society’s borders. Since in these cases, too, 
Adele’s property right to the diamond bracelet would be afforded institution-
al protection against Beatrice, ILE-C4 again implies that the inequality be-
tween them is unjust.  
Where there are background institutions that determine people’s distrib-
utive entitlements, the reach of property rights protection tends to be exten-
sive – so extensive that within those contexts virtually all distributive hold-
ings seem to qualify as institutionally influenced on ILE-C4. Extrapolating 
from the cases just discussed, consider the real-world implications of ILE-C4. 
Since virtually all distributive holdings of individuals worldwide are subject to 
property rights protection, it is not clear which inequalities if any would fail 
to count as institutionally influenced on this construal of Tan’s theory.17 
Perhaps Tan could accept that his theory has this implication. He might 
try to deny its implausibility on the grounds that insofar as global rules and 
norms significantly and pervasively affect people’s basic distributive shares, it 
seems correct upon reflection to regard these inequalities as unjust. Never-
theless, he might argue that, on C4, his theory still avoids the sort of trouble-
some verdicts associated with an implausibly broad range. This is because, he 
                                                
17 Analogous reasoning to that employed in the bracelet inequality case suggests that the 
disadvantages associated with being slightly shortsighted and flat-footed would also be in the 
range on ILE-C4. Imagine that the shortsighted and flat-footed have less disposable income 
than their fortunate counterparts – those with naturally perfect eyesight and normal feet – 
since they have to pay for such things as eyeglasses and arch supports. To the extent that 
institutional arrangements recognize persons without these minor impediments as being 
entitled to their slightly greater economic shares than the others, these inequalities, too, 
count as institutionally influenced and thereby unjust. 
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might claim, some luck-based inequalities would not qualify as institutionally 
influenced on it and hence would be excluded from the range. So, for in-
stance, if Adele did not have an enforceable property right in the bracelet 
that was upheld against Beatrice, then the inequality would not qualify as un-
just. In the absence of an enforceable property right, Adele would merely 
possess the diamond bracelet, as in a state of nature, and Beatrice would be 
free to take it from her. Neither party then would be entitled to the bracelet. 
Only in such cases, in which distributive holdings fall outside the reach of a 
shared property rights scheme, would the inequality in bracelets between Ad-
ele and Beatrice fail to qualify as institutionally influenced.  
Yet the cases that Tan discusses, in which some luck-based inequalities 
are excluded from the range on his theory, are not like those. The unlucky 
disadvantages that he points to do not concern distributive holdings that fall 
outside of the reach of property rights schemes – that is, holdings that have 
the status of state-of-nature possessions. His examples concern institutional 
contexts in which there are established property rights schemes. And under 
those institutional arrangements, it looks as though virtually all distributive 
holdings qualify as institutionally influenced on C4. So, ILE-C4 does not 
provide support for the verdicts that Tan needs in order to show that ILE 
avoids an implausibly broad range.18 
 
3. Legitimate Expectations 
 
I have argued that ILE faces a dilemma. If the theory relies on a conception 
of institutional influence on which the range excludes inequalities that Tan 
thinks should be excluded, then it fails to include inequalities that he thinks 
should be included. If the theory relies on a conception of institutional influ-
ence on which the range includes inequalities that he thinks should be in-
cluded, then it fails to exclude inequalities that he thinks should be excluded.   
Tan might try to avoid the dilemma by invoking a factor that I have not 
mentioned. Suppose that ILE relies on a conception on which the range ap-
pears to be implausibly narrow, such as C1. An illustration of the problem I 
raised for ILE on that conception is that the range would fail to include the 
disadvantages suffered by victims of a hurricane. This is because the losses 
that some citizens endure at the hands of a natural disaster are, obviously, 
not brought about by any institutional intervention. Consider Tan’s account 
                                                
18 Tan might reply that he accepts the verdict that the inequality in bracelets between Adele 
and Beatrice is unjust in the context of a property rights scheme on the grounds that it does 
seem wrong intuitively for a society to allow luck-based discrepancies in the distributive enti-
tlements that it determines. However, he might continue, the range on ILE would still ex-
clude other looks-based inequalities that do not seem unjust, such as the beautiful being 
happier than the ugly. This reply does not circumvent the problem. This is because Tan 
(2012: 127) denies that ILE must depend on a resource-based rather than a welfare-based 
account of the currency of egalitarian justice to avoid giving rise to an implausibly broad 
range. 
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of how ILE avoids that counterintuitive result. As he sees it, a society’s fail-
ure to respond to the plight of hurricane victims would be “an institutional 
injustice because members of a society have the legitimate expectation that 
the state respond adequately within reason to such events” (2008: 681, n. 28). 
That this inequality is unjust seems to be explained at least in part, then, by 
people’s expectations about what they are owed. Tan also makes appeal to 
this sort of explanation to show how ILE avoids an implausibly broad range, 
as it appears to face on C4. In the case of a flat-footed person who experi-
ences minor discomfort associated with her condition, he says, “it is not con-
trary to common sense that she is expected to bear this small cost” (2012: 
143, n. 17). So, by appeal to “expectations” concerning what individuals are 
owed by society, Tan might claim that ILE manages to avoid an implausibly 
narrow or implausibly broad range.  
This response is inadequate. Obviously, Tan is not here referring to the 
actual expectations people happen to have, which might be ignorant or re-
pugnant and have no bearing on the demands of justice. More plausibly, only 
some expectations would count as legitimate. Maybe Tan construes of legiti-
mate expectations in the same way that Rawls does. For Rawls (1999: 273-75; 
2001: 51-52 and 72-73), individuals’ expectations are legitimate when they 
map onto their entitlements as defined by his theory of justice.19 That is, peo-
ple may legitimately expect that which they are owed, which is independently 
justified. Tan, however, cannot help himself to this sort of explanation. If 
individuals’ legitimate expectations were determined by and thus coextensive 
with their entitlements as specified by ILE, then appealing to these expecta-
tions would do nothing to adjust the problematic verdicts that the theory ap-
pears to imply. Such appeal would supply no additional conceptual resources 
beyond the luck/choice principle and whichever conception of institutional 
influence is adopted to change which inequalities fall in the range. 
The device of legitimate expectations can enable adjustments in verdicts 
only if it is grounded in an independent normative principle that provides a 
basis for determining which expectations concerning entitlements are legiti-
mate. Suppose that ILE allows for a normative principle alongside the 
luck/choice principle that does not derive from it. If neither principle has 
priority over the other, then the principles can clash in their recommenda-
tions, leading to irresolvable conflicts. However, if the other principle has 
priority over the luck/choice principle, this too would be problematic. As 
Tan puts it, “The significance and distinctiveness of luck egalitarianism as an 
account of equality is eliminated, if … in the domain of distributive justice, 
the luck/choice principle is defeasible” (2008: 679, n. 25). So even if ILE 
could avoid the problematic implications raised in the last section by relying 
on an independent normative principle, this move is not available to Tan. 
This is because doing so would compromise the primacy of the luck/choice 
principle, thereby undermining ILE’s luck-egalitarian character.   
                                                
19 Tan (2012: 24) appears to endorse this Rawlsian understanding of legitimate expectations. 
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Tan takes ILE to account for why (1) the unjust nature of certain inequalities 
seems to be explained by their source in luck, while (2) not all inequalities 
that stem from luck seem unjust. In his view, accounting for (1) gives ILE an 
advantage over democratic equality, and accounting for (2) gives ILE an ad-
vantage over TILE. 
However, accounting for (1) and (2), as we have seen, requires showing 
that the range on ILE is plausible given the verdicts it supports in particular 
cases. And I have argued that showing this faces substantial, and arguably 
insurmountable, obstacles. ILE depends on the concept of institutional influ-
ence, which Tan does not explain sufficiently. On reflection, it appears that, 
however this concept is construed, the range on ILE is either implausibly 
narrow or implausibly broad. That the theory initially appears to account for 
(1) and (2) may be due to an equivocation between different conceptions of 
institutional influence. As far as I can see, to resist my argument Tan would 
have to invoke a normative principle that is not derivable from the 
luck/choice principle, thus sacrificing the primacy of the luck/choice princi-
ple in the domain of distributive justice. 
Tan appears to be left with three options. He can accept what he regards 
as an implausibly narrow range; accept what he regards as an implausibly 
broad range; or give up on the primacy of the luck/choice principle. It seems 
to me that only the latter two options are viable. This is because it is unclear 
what value there would be in preserving the theory’s luck-egalitarian charac-
ter – by upholding the primacy of the luck/choice principle – if that theory 
cannot account for the unjust nature of precisely the sorts of luck-based ine-
qualities that motivate the luck-egalitarian project.20 So, if Tan wishes to de-
fend a luck-egalitarian theory, it looks like he is committed to what he regards 
as an implausibly broad range. But that commitment would undermine the 
advantage he claims for ILE over TILE. And as Tan sees it, for a theory to 
imply the sorts of verdicts associated with an implausibly broad range, as 
trans-institutional approaches do, “would fatally convict luck egalitarianism 
of absurdity” (2012: 144; see also 126-28 and 143-44). The alternative is giv-
ing up on primacy, but that amounts to giving up on luck egalitarianism.21 In 
                                                
20 In fact, Tan (2012: 142-44) acknowledges that his theory may imply some verdicts associ-
ated with an implausibly narrow range, and he accepts that implication as a price that must 
be paid for ILE’s avoidance of what he regards as the more problematic implication of an 
implausibly broad range. However, on a conception like C1 that implies an implausibly nar-
row range, the problem is not that ILE yields counterintuitive verdicts in a handful of cases. 
Rather, the problem is pervasive: ILE on such a conception fails to account for the unjust 
nature of inequalities that are central to demonstrating the intuitive appeal of luck egalitarian-
ism. 
21 Notwithstanding Tan’s explicit claims to the contrary, that ILE may rely on a foundational 
normative principle other than the luck/choice principle is suggested by his (2012: 79 and 
159) appeals to the value of reciprocity in justifying the demands of ILE. So, perhaps ILE 
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any case, if my arguments are sound, then the merits of an institutional ver-
sion of luck egalitarianism are dubious.22 
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turns out to bear greater resemblance to a version of democratic equality than Tan recogniz-
es. 
22 I am very grateful to Torin Alter for numerous helpful conversations and written com-
ments, as well as to two anonymous referees for the Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy for 
their detailed suggestions for improvement. I benefited from the opportunity to present an 
earlier version of this paper at the Australian National University. Work on this paper was 
supported by an RGC grant from the University of Alabama. 
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